AMENDED MOTION - OCTOBER 6, 1999

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

۹. ∆

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

REPORT	ER'S R	ECORD
VOLUME	OF	L VOLUMES ( E+D'
TRIAL COURT	CAUSE	NO. 95-63
WILLIAM B. JONES	)(	IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
VS.	) (	VAN ZANDT COUNTY, TEXAS
UDO BIRNBAUM	)(	294TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

υ

AMENDED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

On the 6th day of October, 1998, the Hearing on came on to be heard outside the presence of a jury, in the above-entitled and -numbered cause; and the following proceedings were had before the Honorable JAMES ZIMMERMANN, Judge presiding, held in CANTON, VAN ZANDT County, Texas:

Proceedings reported by COMPUTERIZED STENOTYPE MACHINE; Reporter's Record produced BY COMPUTER-ASSISTED TRANSCRIPTION.

LYNDA K. BRAGG, Texas CSR #3774-Exp. 12/31/00 Official Trial Reporter - 294th Judicial District

Rt. 2, Box 18-A

Jacksonville, Texas

## FILE COPY

## APPEARANCES:

• •

1	<u>APPEARANCES:</u>
2 3	MR. RICHARD L. RAY Attorney at Law 300 S. Trades Day Blvd.
4	Canton, Texas 75103 COUNSEL FOR MR. WILLIAM B. JONES
5	- A N D -
6	MR. MARTIN BENNETT P.O. Box 152
7	Athens, Texas 75751 COUNSEL FOR MR. UDO BIRNBAUM
8	
9	
10	
11 12	
12	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	• .
23	
24 ~25	
· · · · ·	

۳ جن	AMENDED MOTION - OCTOBER 6, 1999	3
1	<u>EXHIBIT INDEX</u> .	
2	OCTOBER 6TH, 1998	
3	HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	
4	FOR AMENDED JUDGMENT ON VERDICT	
5		
6	· ·	
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
_25		
•		

** . 2	AMENDED MOTION - OCTOBER 6, 1999	4
. 1	PROCEEDINGS:	
2	THE COURT: Jones against Birnbaum?	
3	MR. BENNETT: Good morning, Judge.	
4	THE COURT: Good morning.	
5	MR. BENNETT: Judge, I'm Martin	
6	Bennett. Mr. Birnbaum has finally	
7	gotten around to hiring an attorney.	
8	(WHEREUPON, an off-the-record	
9	discussion was had.)	
10	THE COURT: Mr. Jones, make	
11	yourself comfortable. I've got lawyers	
12	on both sides now.	
13	MR. JONES: I want to keep him out	
14	of trouble, if I can.	
15	THE COURT: What's your pleasure?	
16	MR. BENNETT: Judge, I don't know	
17	whether you've had the opportunity I	
18	faxed to you, yesterday, a brief in	
19	support of our motions here today. We	
20	have a motion for entry of judgment,	
21	that I believe we're considering	
22	THE COURT: I now have what?	
23	MR. BENNETT: I believe Mr. Ray has	
24	a counter reply brief to the points that	
-25	I raised in that. But the motion that I	

AMENDED MOTION - OCTOBER 6, 1999

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

-25

have on file here, is for motion for entry of judgment, and also a motion not withstanding the verdict.

I believe the three issues, basically, that we're looking at, is whether attorney's fees should be awarded, whether a permanent injunction should be granted, and whether costs of the court should be awarded.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BENNETT: But we're ready to proceed. I believe there was a motion for continuance that was set for today, also, but we're ready to proceed.

MR. RAY: Judge, we're certainly ready to proceed.

THE COURT: All right. As you can tell, I've got a 12 page criminal docket. I've worked my way through a good portion of it, and I don't want to -- How long do you think it will take?

MR. BENNETT: Judge, I think that we ought to have it argued, both sides, within 30 minutes, I would think.

> LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

~25

MR. RAY: I'd think so too, Judge. We won't be bogged down, hopefully this time, with Mr. Birnbaum wanting to examine me on the witness stand. It shouldn't take very long. As I see it, Judge, we're at the stage where it's the Court's ministerial duty to go ahead and enter a judgment based on the verdict.

I think a number of the issues that we're raising here, are really probably more appropriately addressed, motion for new trial. I anticipate that coming after the entry of the judgment, Judge.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to figure out the timing. You're from --

MR. BENNETT: Athens.

THE COURT: You don't practice with Fred Head; do you?

MR. BENNETT: No, Judge. I'm partners with Hank Skelton.

THE COURT: Well, I just wanted to ask to be sure. We're off the record.

(WHEREUPON, an off-the-record

discussion was had.)

THE COURT: How about 11 o'clock?

AMENDED MOTION - OCTOBER 6, 1999

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

 $\sim 25$ 

. :\*

MR. RAY: That will be fine, Judge. THE COURT: Maybe I'll be through with all of this by then.

MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Judge.

(WHEREUPON, a recess was had at this time in this case.)

THE COURT: We come now to Cause No. 95-63; Jones against Birnbaum. Let the record reflect, that both parties are present, together with their respect respective counsel. We have motions for entry of judgment on file from both parties, together with Mr. Birnbaum's motion for judgment N.O.V. and briefs from both sides in support, thereof. Are both sides ready to argue those motions?

MR. RAY: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. BENNETT: Mr. Birnbaum is ready, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any agreement as to what the order of argument will be? Mr. Ray's motion for judgment was filed first. It's my intention to let both sides say

> LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

~25

everything they want to say.

MR. BENNETT: Judge, I have no objection to Mr. Ray proceeding first, if that's his wish.

MR. RAY: Judge, essentially, our motion for entry of the judgment, quite frankly, is simply to have the Court perform it's administerial act, based on the verdict from the jury.

Now, concerning the motion N.O.V, we've got a response and brief to that, Judge, but that's not my motion. So I don't know if you want me to try to argue my response.

THE COURT: No. I'll let him argue the motion -- the N.O.V. motion, and you can go ahead and argue for your motion for judgment. The reason I said it that way, was, I think --

MR. RAY: Judge, I think our motion was filed first.

THE COURT: No question about that. Mr. Birnbaum has also filed, in addition to the N.O.V. motion, a motion for entry of judgment. So you go ahead and argue

LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

-25

your motion and I'll let him take a shot at his.

MR. RAY: Your Honor, the Plaintiff has presented the proposed judgment based on the findings of the jury. And the jury answered in response to Question 1 and in Question 3, as you know, affirmative findings in Question 2, and did not -- and entered zero on damages, Judge.

So I'm prepared to present to the Court, a proposed judgment based upon those findings. One, to provide for a mandatory injunction, based upon the fact finding of the jury. And also, a permanent injunction concerning the free-flowing stream, and concerning the erection or construction of dams or the allowance of such, with respect to the property of Mr. Birnbaum. The overflow of it would result into Mr. Jones' property. I believe that to be the finding of the jury, with respect to the fact issue that the jury found in special Question No. 1.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

-25

In addition, Your Honor, we have entered attorney fees. I think the attorney fees are going to be where the real bone of the contention lies, Judge. I think the issue is going to revolve around, number one, was there statutory authority supporting attorney fees.

I think probably what we're going to discover, Judge, is that attorney fees -- we argued that they're allowable in this instance, because there was no objection ever made by Mr. Birnbaum, either at the time the evidence was offered concerning attorney fees, or at the time whenever that particular question was submitted to the jury.

Because of that, he has waived his right now -- and that's our position, Judge. And, of course, our -- under injunction, you're not entitled to attorney fees. So that presents a dilemma, as I see it, for the Court. Of course, it will be the Court's determination as to what's occurred there.

LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Judge, our position probably is best tracked, and even one case that I have, which is the case that essentially is our case, except it was tried to the Court. It involves 11.086 of the Water Code.

In that particular instance, the attorney representing the party that was in the same position as I am in this case, the attorney sought attorney fees. The person's side was representing by counsel. They especially accepted to attorney's fees based on their argument that attorney fees were not authorized.

Then that attorney came back and amended his pleadings, and tried to make it fit under declaratory judgment action by adding an additional count. The Court went ahead and awarded the attorney fees, based on it being a declaratory judgment act, over the objection of the opposing party's counsel.

The Court of Appeals reversed, based on the objection. The difference

2

3

4

5

б

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

~25

in this case, is no objection has been made up until now -- or any argument made, that attorney fees would not be allowable.

Now, I've tried to do such research in our brief, Judge, essentially goes to citing all of those cases. That says, if you don't object during the trial, so the trial Court has the opportunity, at that point, to make a determination, you just go ahead and allow the evidence in and allow it to be submitted as has occurred to this point, which you've waived that objection.

Judge, so it's our position; one, that we're certainly entitled to the injunction in whatever form the Court really thinks it should be, based on the fact findings concerning the damming up of the stream and the potentiality for it in the future.

Number two, we believe we're still entitled to our attorney fees, because Mr. Birnbaum failed to ever object to the submission of the issue or the

> LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

 $\sim 25$ 

submission of evidence -- admission, of course, is in the trial record.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ray.

MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Judge, Mr. Ray. Judge, the question -- I believe Mr. Ray and I do agree upon the fact that the attorney's fees being granted in this case is legally insufficient. Under Article 38.001 of the Code of Civil Remedies, there are certain specific requirements where a plaintiff can recover attorney's fees. Mr. Jones does not fit in any of those categories.

So from a legally sufficient point of view, I do not believe that he qualifies for attorney fees. That is the only pleadings that's on file with this court is under Section 38.001.

The question that was specifically presented to the jury was, "What sum of money, if any, do you find from the preponderance of the evidence, would be reasonable and necessary attorney's fees for the services, if any, performed by

Plaintiff's attorney".

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

 $\sim 25$ 

There is no question as to whether they should be presented or not be presented. The only question is how much money is reasonable and necessary.

I believe it is a question for the Court to decide if attorney's fees should be granted or not be granted. And once again, we go to the general rule, that the movants are responsible for each -- for their own attorneys fees, unless there is a contract or a specific statute, that's going to approve of attorney's fees.

There is no contract in this case. The specific statute that the Plaintiff seems to be relying on in this case, does not qualify him. He does not fit into any of the categories that is listed in 38.001.

So as a matter of law, we come to you to say, that really, there is no choice. There is no legally sufficient evidence. There is no parameters at all where he can recover -- whether the jury

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

~25

thought that that is reasonable and necessary attorney's fees or not. The question is presented -- that the jury didn't answer, is whether he should be granted those attorney's fees to start with.

We then go on to the question of whether a judgment -- or excuse me, a permanent injunction should be granted against Mr. Birnbaum. The requirements for a permanent injunction is that there be serious injury. This extraordinary remedy that is asked for, is required that there be serious and permanent injury to Mr. Jones. I don't believe that that is the case.

The evidence in this case seems to present that there was some minor flooding of the land. This is the type of serious injury that is expected to grant this type of extraordinary remedy.

There also needs to be a requirement, that there is no adequate remedy of law. There is an adequate remedy of law for Mr. Jones. He can

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

come to court. If there is any future damage to his land; he can come back to this court again and ask for damages, so he does have a remedy.

The fact of trying to get a permanent injunction against Mr. Birnbaum to remove dams that are occasionally built by beavers, is putting a burden on him. So I don't believe that that extraordinary remedy is called for -- and that we ought to see if any damages do occur in the future -- hopefully, they will not, but if they do, Mr. Jones certainly has his remedy.

There's also in the judgment that Mr. Ray has presented to the Court, a cost of the court provision, that the defendant be responsible for all costs of the court. I have provided you a specific case, Judge, in my brief. That states that the Plaintiff in this case was not a successful party -- and that is the requirement for them to recover costs of court. They must be a

LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

successful party.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

 $\sqrt{25}$ 

The code, in saying -- of the case that I cited to you in my brief, is that even if a party prevails on the question of negligence, if they do not receive any damages, they are considered to be an unsuccessful party. So since they are unsuccessful, I believe that also goes to the issue of attorney's fees.

If they were a successful party, and even did qualify under 38.001, which they do not, they would need to be a successful party before being eligible for those attorney's fees. That's within your discretion.

We know that the issues, once again, were presented as to the attorney's fees -- Judge, if you want me to, I can proceed on with my J.N.O.V, because the arguments are of course very similar. But if the Court believes that the jury did answer the question that attorney fees should be granted in this case -- which, once again, we state the question never was asked of the jury as

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

-25

to whether they should be or shouldn't be, but if the Court determines that they came close enough to answering that question, we believe that it is within your power to render a judgment, notwithstanding that verdict.

In fact, the plaintiff is legally not entitled to such recovery. Thank you.

THE COURT: You get to open and close on your motion -- and I'm going to give him the last word, if any more he has to share on the NOV Motion.

MR. RAY: Thank you, Judge. Judge, the Court hasn't had the opportunity to this case -- and I would like to go ahead and present it to the Court at this time. I'll go ahead and give a copy of that to Mr. Bennett.

Judge, this is that particular case that I was arguing about a second ago -and I should have approached the bench and give it to you then.

Judge, that is the case that tracks very closely the exact facts that we

LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

have before us here in this particular case.

Judge, I think we're at a point now, where what is an administerial duty of the Court at this stage in entering this judgment. Does it precede to enter the judgment based on findings of the jury. I think the findings of the jury are clear. That still leaves open the consideration of a motion for new trial, which I thoroughly expect is going to be filed by Mr. Birnbaum's Counsel.

But, I think that at this stage, Judge, I think the Court's responsibility is really an administerial duty more than it is anything else. That's just really to enter that judgment. Of course, if the issue of attorney fees are raised again, a motion for new trial, I think that will -- and I anticipate it will be, then we're going to have to finally deal with that at some point.

Our continued position is going to be that it is waived, because there was

> LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

~25

no objection ever made. That's the purpose for our brief, Judge, is to really support that position.

Had Mr. Birnbaum had counsel, we wouldn't be in this predicament. I feel certain his counsel would have taken one look and said, "We're going to object to submission of the attorney fees. We're going to object to any evidence coming out. We want you to show what statutory authority you have to seek attorney fees". That didn't happen.

As a result, we've gone through the complete trial. We've got a verdict from the jury. I think it was the clear intention of the jury, that it awarded attorney fees, because it did not award any actual damages.

Now, concerning which party prevailed, the primary desire of the Plaintiff, Mr. Jones, was to obtain an injunction, so that he wouldn't have to repeatedly come back to the court to keep his property from being flooded. The jury made a fact finding, which

LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

~25

I believe was favorable to him, and supports the entry of an injunction.

The jury did not find any damages. And Mr. Bennett seems to think that if the jury didn't find any actual damages to the land, that therefore, Mr. Jones was not a willing party.

However, I don't think the jury had that impression at all when they returned the verdict. Because the jury came back after that, and went ahead and awarded substantial attorney fees.

Mr. Jones, himself, I think, as I recall, testified that the creek receded. The dam had apparently been removed after the suit was filed. So as a result, he didn't have overflow water right now.

So Judge, our request and our desire, is that the Court go ahead and enter the judgment in the form that we're presenting to the Court. And then at that point, we can begin the steps of appeal. The Court still has jurisdiction over the case under a

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

motion for new trial to reconsider whatever it thinks appropriate.

I think we've got to really have the judgment entered to get into that. Otherwise, I don't know what's going --I don't see how we can resolve the case really, Judge. Because we're left with our remedies being a writ of mandamus or something.

If the Court should choose not to grant attorney fees, I would vastly rather deal with it, Judge, on the other side of the judgment entered that reflected what the jury's findings were, and deal with it through a motion for new trial on the other side.

THE COURT: Mr. Ray, let me ask one question.

MR. RAY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If in the ordinary course of events -- let me strike that. If in the usual course of events, by which I mean, had Mr. Birnbaum had counsel at the time of the trial, and had counsel, as you suggested, made a

> LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

~25

timely objection about the submission of attorney's fees, then as you point out, we probably wouldn't be in -- at least that part of the dilemma.

Now, what that says, as I understand the law, is that had the case been tried properly from Mr. Birnbaum's standpoint, given the final outcome, Mr. Jones would not be entitled to attorney's fees -- or you would not be entitled to attorney's fees. Now given that, help me understand how waiver operates to change that.

MR. RAY: Judge, that's -- excuse me. Judge, that's the purpose of our brief. We've cited, in our brief, a number of cases. Those cases indicate that if you waive the submission and you waive the admissibility of all the evidence that comes in to establish it, that you have waived the ability to raise it.

One of the reasons is -- The new appellate rules, I believe it's Rule 33, essentially says, that if an objection

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

~25

is not timely made, then at that point, you've lost the right to raise it on appeal.

So as a result, it's not something that would create reversible error. I think the reason for that, is because the trial court should know if there's an objection timely, so the trial Court can rule on it; rather than us reaching this point, where suddenly the discovery is made, and the Court has tried the case. Judge, I can go into my brief, if you would like.

THE COURT: That's all right. I know you have a brief, and I obviously -- since it was just handed to me minutes ago, have not had a chance to study either one of your briefs.

I wanted you to touch on that and I appreciate it. Do you have anything else, Mr. Bennett?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, Judge. To specifically address your issue that you bring up, Rule 379 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states -- in the last

LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

part of that rule -- that a claim that the evidence was legally or factually insufficient to warrant the submission of any question, may be made for the first time after verdict; regardless of whether the submission of such question was requested by the complainant.

So I believe it's within your discretion to ignore the submission of the question, particularly if it's irrelevant, Judge.

The Court, in rendering judgment, may disregard questions that are immaterial. McDonald's Texas Civil Practice states that a question is immaterial when it should not have been submitted, or, though properly submitted, it has been rendered immaterial by other findings.

The other findings in this -- first of all, I state that the question should have never been submitted. I believe Mr. Ray is agreeing with me that it should never have been submitted. But we also come to the question, is it

LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

rendered immaterial by other findings. One of the findings, that again, we don't have in this case, as to whether the jury even said should attorney's fees ever be awarded to start with. They have not specifically answered that question.

The only fact they answered is that the 10 thousand dollars is the reasonable amount. The question is still begs, should they be presented at all.

That's where we say that they have not answered the question. We don't believe your duty here is simply ministerial. You have an administerial duty to enter a judgment, but not any particular judgment. It's within your discretion to determine which judgment you will enter -- and that's the purpose for our hearing today.

So we ask you, then, to rule, of course, that the attorney's fee were immaterial when being asked for to start with.

LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

1

2

3

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

-25

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. RAY: Judge, when you consider that, I'd like for you to take a look --We also cite McDonald. It's 27.65.

In that particular area, Judge, it concerns the jury verdict, the Court's responsibility -- and it even says, Judge, that the trial court may feel compelled later to set an entire judgment aside, but it's judgment still should reflect the findings of the jury, originally.

THE COURT: Tell me that citation, again.

MR. RAY: Judge, that is 27, McDonald Texas Civil Procedure -- or rather, Civil Practice, Section 65B. Judge we cited right close to the conclusion of our brief.

> THE COURT: Oh, it's in your brief? MR. RAY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I just sent your brief -- or briefs out with Ms. Young, the clerk, to get copies made for me. Anything else, gentlemen, on this?

> LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869

MR. RAY: Nothing further from the Plaintiff, Your Honor.

MR. BENNETT: Nothing further on the motion for entry of judgment.

THE COURT: Let me see ya'll up here. For the record, this completes this hearing. The Court will take it under advisement and will read your authorities, and will have a decision for you as quickly as I can -- but let me visit with you up here. This is off the record, Lynda.

(WHEREUPON, this hearing was recessed for the day.)

)

)

THE STATE OF TEXAS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

COUNTY OF VAN ZANDT

I, Lynda Kay Carson-Bragg, Certified Shorthand Reporter, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of ALL THE PROCEEDINGS in the above styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open Court or in Chambers, and were reported by me.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that this transcription of the record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties.

WITNESS My hand, this the \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1999.

LYNDA KAY BRAGG, CSR CSR #3774 Rt. 2 Box 18-A Jacksonville, Texas 75766

I FURTHER CERTIFY that the cost of this Statement of Facts to \_\_\_\_\_ is \_\_\_\_\_.

LYNDA K. BRAGG, CSR (903) 586-2869